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Abstract	
Propaganda	often	compares	members	of	stigmatised	outgroups	to	non-human	
entities	such	as	rats,	lice	and	snakes.	Drawing	on	these	horrifying	descriptions,	
the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	proposes	that	outgroup	members	are	viewed	as	
‘less	than	human’,	and	that	being	viewed	as	less	than	human	renders	them	
vulnerable	to	harm.	I	offer	seven	challenges	to	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis.	I	
argue	that,	even	in	supposedly	prototypical	examples	of	extreme	
dehumanisation,	outgroup	members	are	not	treated	in	a	similar	way	to	non-
human	entities.		Furthermore,	although	outgroup	members	may	be	denied	some	
human	qualities	and	states,	they	are	attributed	others.	I	also	argue	that	there	is	
reason	to	doubt	the	hypothesised	causal	connection	between	being	viewed	as	
less	than	human	and	being	at	risk	of	harm	–	some	non-human	organisms	are	
treated	with	great	care,	and	some	groups	are	harmed	because	of	how	their	
uniquely	human	qualities	are	perceived.	I	close	by	offering	an	alternative	
account	of	why	outgroup	members	are	sometimes	referred	to	as	nonhuman	
entities.		
	
	 	
Challenges	for	dehumanisation	
	 3	
Seven	challenges	for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	
Between	1941	and	1945,	the	Nazis	murdered	up	to	6	million	of	Europe’s	Jewish	
population	(Kershaw,	2001).		In	the	spring	of	1994,	Rwandan	Hutus	murdered	
close	to	1	million	Tutsis	(Tirrell,	2012).		In	the	early	2000s,	American	soldiers	
tortured	and	murdered	Iraqi	prisoners	of	war	at	Abu	Ghraib	(Apel,	2005).		
Victims	of	these	atrocities,	and	others	like	them,	were	often	compared	to	non-
human	entities	-	to	rats,	lice,	dogs	and	cockroaches	(Smith,	2011;	2014).		
Research	on	dehumanisation	seeks	to	offer	a	causal	explanation	for	the	
apparent	association	between	describing	victims	of	atrocities	as	non-human	and	
inflicting	harm	upon	them.		Research	in	this	field	can	be	broadly	summarised	as	
two	related	hypotheses	1)	Victims	of	intergroup	harm	are	perceived	to	be	similar	
to	non-human	entities	2)	As	a	result,	natural	inhibitions	against	causing	them	
harm	are	eroded	leading,	in	extreme	cases,	to	genocide	and	torture.	I	refer	to	
these	two	inter-related	claims	as	‘the	dehumanisation	hypothesis’.		
The	dehumanisation	hypothesis	is	ambitious	in	that	it	seeks	to	explain	a	
wide	range	of	phenomena	by	appealing	to	the	same	psychological	construct.	
Blatant	dehumanisation,	in	which	outgroup	members	are	removed	from	the	
human	category,	is	thought	to	play	a	causal	role	in	genocide	and	torture	(Smith,	
2011;	2014;	2016;	Viki,	Osgood,	&	Phillips,	2013).		More	subtle	forms	of	
dehumanisation,	in	which	outgroup	members	are	viewed	as	‘less	human’	than	
the	ingroup,	are	thought	to	play	a	causal	role	in	less	extreme	acts	of	harm	such	as	
withholding	help	from	individuals	in	need	and	feeling	reduced	concern	for	their	
well-being	(Andrighetto,	Baldissarri,	Lattanzio,	Loughnan,	&	Volpato,	2014;	
Cuddy,	Rock,	&	Norton,	2007;	Haslam	2006;	Leyens	et	al.,	2007).		
Since	its	conception,	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	has	gained	
considerable	prominence	in	social	neuroscience	(Harris,	2017;	Harris	&	Fiske,	
2006;	2009;	2011),	social	psychology	(Haslam,	2006;	Leyens,	Demoulin,	Vaes,	
Gaunt,	&	Paladino,	2007)	and	philosophy	(Smith,	2011;	2014;	2016).	Indeed,	the	
hypothesis	has	become	so	prominent	that	the	idea	certain	groups	suffer	
dehumanisation	has	been	described	as	something	of	a	truism	(Smith,	2016).		
I	will	argue	that,	while	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	is	prima	facie	
reasonable,	and	indeed	intuitively	compelling,	it	does	not	withstand	scrutiny.	I	
review	the	major	formulations	of	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	from	
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neuroscience,	psychology	and	philosophy.	Combining	across	behavioural	data,	
brain	data,	and	the	historical	evidence,	I	suggest	that	outgroup	members	are	not	
represented	in	a	similar	way	to	non-human	entities.		Rather,	they	are	likely	
attributed	characteristics	that	are	typical	of	humans	but	anti-social	in	character	
such	as	jealousy,	spite	and	cunning	(Appiah	2008;	Bloom,	2017;	Lang,	2010;	
Manne,	2016).	Furthermore,	rather	than	protecting	them	from	harm,	being	
viewed	as	having	these	distinctly	human	attributes	may	put	them	at	greater	risk	
of	harm	(Bloom	2017;	Gopnik,	2006;	Lang,	2010;	Manne,	2016;	2018).		
	
Variants	of	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	
The	dehumanisation	hypothesis	is	not	represented	by	a	single	theory	but	rather	
by	a	family	of	theories	from	neuroscience,	psychology	and	philosophy	(Harris	&	
Fiske,	2006;	2011;	Haslam,	2006;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	2014;	Leyens	et	al.,	2007;	
Smith,	2011;	2016;	Vaes,	Leyens,	Paladino,	&	Miranda,	2012).		These	theories	
share	key	underlying	assumptions	but	differ	in	the	particular	way	in	which	they	
characterise	the	construct	of	dehumanisation.		That	is	to	say,	each	theory	offers	a	
somewhat	different	characterisation	of	what	is	thought	to	be	‘missing’	when	a	
person	or	group	is	considered	less	than	human.	Below	I	briefly	review	the	most	
prominent	contemporary	theories	from	philosophy	(Smith,	2011;	2016),	
neuroscience	(Harris	&	Fiske,	2006;	2011)	and	psychology	(Haslam,	2006;	
Leyens	et	al.,	2007).		
The	philosopher	Smith	(2011)	offers	a	characterisation	of	dehumanisation	
that	centres	around	essentialism.		According	to	this	theory,	humans	are	those	to	
whom	we	attribute	a	‘human	essence’.			Those	to	whom	we	attribute	a	
‘subhuman	essence’	are	dehumanised.	Smith	draws	the	majority	of	his	evidence	
from	historical	documents,	including	analyses	of	propaganda,	in	which	target	
groups	are	described	as	dangerous	or	disgusting	animals	such	as	rats	and	lice.	In	
his	more	recent	writings,	Smith	(2016)	argues	that	dehumanisation	involves	
simultaneously	categorising	a	group	as	human	in	appearance	but	subhuman	in	
essence.	According	to	this	view,	simultaneously	categorising	someone	as	human	
and	sub-human	gives	rise	to	a	feeling	of	‘uncanniness’	or	creepiness	(Smith,	
2016).		
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In	contrast,	Harris	and	Fiske	(2006;	2011)	offer	a	characterisation	of	
dehumanisation	that	focuses	on	mental	state	attribution.		According	to	this	
theory,	when	we	consider	a	social	group	to	be	human,	we	attribute	mental	states	
to	them.		When	we	consider	a	social	group	to	be	‘less	than	human’,	we	either	do	
not	attribute	mental	states	to	them	or	attribute	fewer	mental	states	to	them	
(Harris	&	Fiske,	2006;	2011).		Harris	and	Fiske	(2006;	2011)	argue	that	groups	
perceived	to	be	low	in	warmth	and	competence,	such	as	drug	addicts	and	the	
homeless,	are	particularly	likely	to	be	dehumanised.		To	the	extent	that	they	are	
dehumanised,	they	will	elicit	disgust.	Harris	and	Fiske	(2006)	provide	
neuroscientific	data	to	support	their	characterisation	-	participants	display	less	
activity	in	brain	regions	associated	with	mentalising,	more	specifically	the	
medial	prefrontal	cortex,	when	viewing	images	of	homeless	individuals	and	
people	addicted	to	drugs	compared	to	when	viewing	images	of	their	own	group.		
Convergent	evidence	comes	from	behavioural	work	demonstrating	that	adults	
use	fewer	mental	state	words	when	describing	the	daily	activities	of	individuals	
from	these	groups	(Harris	&	Fiske,	2011)	and	data	suggesting	that	participants	
have	more	stringent	criteria	for	perceiving	a	mind	behind	an	artificial	face	when	
that	face	belongs	to	an	outgroup	(Hackel,	Looser,	&	van	Bavel,	2014).	
Leyens	and	colleagues	(2007)	explicitly	departed	from	the	tradition	of	
seeking	to	explain	extreme	intergroup	harm	such	as	genocide	and	torture,	
instead	focusing	on	more	subtle	manifestations	of	intergroup	biases	within	
contemporary	Western	society.		They	conducted	an	informal	survey	in	which	
they	asked	participants	what	attributes	they	thought	of	as	uniquely	human.		
Focusing	on	a	subset	of	their	participants’	responses	that	referenced	emotions,	
Leyens	and	colleagues	argued	that	groups	are	subtly	dehumanised	to	the	extent	
that	they	are	thought	to	be	lacking	in	secondary,	or	complex,	emotions	such	as	
pride,	guilt	and	remorse.	In	support	of	their	view,	they	found	that	individuals	
typically	attribute	secondary	emotions	more	strongly	to	their	ingroup	than	to	
outgroups	(Demoulin,	et	al.,	2004).		In	order	to	distinguish	their	work	from	
research	on	more	blatant	forms	of	dehumanisation,	they	termed	this	
hypothesised	psychological	process	‘infrahumanisation’.		
Building	on	the	work	of	Leyens	and	colleagues,	Haslam	and	colleagues	
(Haslam,	Bain,	Douge,	Lee	and	Bastian,	2005;	Haslam,	2006;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	
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2014)	sought	to	characterise	dehumanisation	by	first	understanding	folk	
perceptions	of	what	it	means	to	be	human.	Haslam	et	al.	(2005)	asked	
participants	to	complete	two	tasks:	First,	rating	a	list	of	attributes	for	the	extent	
to	which	they	applied	to	humans	and	not	to	other	species	and,	second,	rating	a	
list	of	attributes	for	the	extent	to	which	they	were	characteristic	of	humans.	On	
the	basis	of	their	answers	to	these	two	questions,	Haslam	inferred	there	were	
two	forms	of	humanness.		Uniquely	human	attributes	were	those	participants	
listed	as	distinguishing	humans	from	other	species	and	consisted	of	civility,	
refinement,	moral	sensibility,	rationality	and	maturity.		Human	nature	attributes	
were	those	participants	listed	as	characteristic	of	humans	and	consisted	of	
emotional	responsiveness,	interpersonal	warmth,	openness,	agency	and	
emotional	depth.		Haslam	(2006)	postulated	two	corresponding	forms	of	
dehumanisation:	Animalistic	dehumanisation,	where	individuals	or	groups	are	
thought	to	possess	fewer	uniquely	human	attributes,	and	mechanistic	
dehumanisation	where	individuals	or	groups	are	thought	to	possess	fewer	
human	nature	attributes.		
	
The	relationship	between	dehumanisation	and	intergroup	harm		
Much	of	the	interest	in	dehumanisation	stems	from	the	claim	that	it	plays	a	
causal	role	in	intergroup	harm.		According	to	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis,	
humans	are	naturally	inclined	to	empathise	with,	and	care	for,	each	other.		When	
these	barriers	against	harm	are	removed,	or	eroded,	individuals	are	at	greater	
risk	of	discrimination	(Smith,	2011;	Harris	&	Fiske,	2011).	Smith	(2011;	2016)	
describes	dehumanisation	as	“a	psychological	lubricant	for	the	machinery	of	
violence”	arguing	that	it	plays	“a	significant	role	in	facilitating	and	motivating	
episodes	of	genocide,	war,	slavery,	and	other	forms	of	mass	violence”.	This	
reasoning	is	echoed	by	Harris	and	Fiske	(2011)	who	argue	that	“dehumanized	
perception,	a	failure	to	spontaneously	consider	the	mind	another	person,	may	be	
a	psychological	mechanism	facilitating	inhumane	acts	like	torture”.	Similarly,	
Haslam	and	Loughnan	(2014)	argue	that	“a	major	impetus	for	the	study	of	
dehumanization	is	to	understand	its	profoundly	negative	consequences.	
Dehumanization	of	enemies,	victims,	and	colonized	peoples	has	been	associated	
with	pogroms,	atrocities,	and	exploitation”.	Haslam	and	Loughnan	(2014)	further	
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elaborate	on	this	hypothesised	causal	connection	by	arguing	that	
dehumanisation	results	in	reductions	in	prosocial	behaviour,	commission	of	
antisocial	acts,	and	disinhibition	of	violence.			
Evidence	consistent	with	this	proposed	causal	relation	has	been	drawn	
from	analyses	of	historical	documents.	Analysis	of	propaganda	and	other	
historical	documents	shows	that	regimes	that	commit	genocide	and	other	
atrocities	often	compare	their	victims	to	non-human	entities	such	as	rats,	lice	
and	cockroaches.	These	examples	are	widely	cited	in	psychological	research	on	
dehumanisation	(e.g.,	Harris	&	Fiske,	2011;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	2014)	but	have	
been	most	comprehensively	studied	philosophers	(Smith,	2011;	Tirrell,	2012).	
Smith	(2011),	for	example,	focuses	primarily	on	examples	from	Nazi	Germany	
and	American	slavery.		He	points	to	a	plethora	of	cases	in	which	victims	of	these	
regimes	were	compared	to,	or	even	described	as,	subhuman	creatures.	
Furthermore,	when	interviewed	after	atrocities	they	have	committed,	
perpetrators	of	mass	violence	periodically	report	that	they	did	not	view	their	
victims	as	human	(Hatzfeld,	2003).			
Further	evidence	consistent	with	the	claim	that	dehumanisation	is	
causally	related	to	harm	comes	from	lab-based	research.	This	research	typically	
shows	that	measures	of	dehumanisation	correlate	with	willingness	to	endorse	
harm.		For	example,	Kteily	and	colleagues	showed	that	the	extent	to	which	
American	participants	endorsed	the	claim	that	Arabs	“seem	less	highly	evolved”	
than	do	Americans	predicted	their	endorsement	of	discrimination	against	Arabs	
(Kteily,	Bruneau,	Waytz,		&	Cotterill,	2015;	see	also	Kteily	&	Bruneau,	2017).		In	
related	work,	Goff,	Eberhardt,	Williams	and	Jackson	(2008)	found	that	White	
participants	implicitly	associate	African	Americans	with	apes	and	that	
participants	who	have	been	primed	with	ape-related	words	are	more	likely	to	
condone	police	violence	against	a	suspect	but	only	when	that	suspect	is	African	
American.		Other	research	on	the	attribution	of	human	qualities	has	shown	that	
participants’	tendency	to	deny	labourers	in	sweatshops	mental	experiences	such	
as	the	capacity	to	form	plans,	as	well	as	to	feel	emotions	such	as	love	and	pain,	
correlates	with	their	willingness	to	endorse	the	use	of	sweatshop	labour	(Rai,	
Valdesolo,	&	Graham,	2017).		
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Seven	challenges	for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	
	
Challenge	1:	Comparisons	to	non-human	entities	are	not	reserved	for	
outgroups	
A	key	source	of	evidence	in	favour	of	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	comes	from	
real	world	examples	of	situations	in	which	members	of	certain	outgroups	have	
been	compared	to	non-human	entities	(Smith,	2011;	2014;	2016;	Tirrell,	2012).		
While	intuitively	compelling,	these	examples	alone	are	not	sufficient	to	conclude	
that	outgroup	members	are	viewed	as	more	similar	to	non-human	entities	than	
are	ingroup	members.		If	using	historical	associations	between	groups	and	
animals	as	one	source	of	evidence	for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis,	it	is	
crucial	to	search	for	disconfirmatory	as	well	as	confirmatory	cases	(see	
Nickerson,	1998,	for	a	review	of	research	on	the	confirmation	bias).	Surveying	
real-world	examples	more	broadly,	it	is	clear	that	comparisons	to	non-human	
entities	are	not	always	used	as	a	way	to	insult	or	demean	(Haslam,	Loughnan,	&	
Sun,	2011).		Comparisons	to	animals	can	be	used	to	compliment	an	individual,	
and	even	to	highlight	some	of	their	prototypically	human	virtues.		For	example,	
the	epithet	‘Lionheart’	was	intended	to	emphasise	the	bravery	of	Richard	the	
first	in	battle.	While	comparing	a	person	to	a	monkey	can	sometimes	be	deeply	
offensive,	using	‘little	monkey’	as	a	term	of	endearment	to	describe	a	toddler	
might	emphasise	that	they	are	charming	and	mischievous.	Similarly,	comparing	
an	athlete	to	a	machine	might	emphasise	their	perseverance	and	skill.	Closely	
related	to	this,	social	groups	often	invoke	non-human	entities	to	refer	to	
themselves.		For	example,	sports	teams	often	have	non-human	entities	as	their	
emblems	and	might	refer	to	themselves	as	the	lions,	bulls,	the	blades,	the	
gunners	or	the	eagles	(See	Figure	1).	
It	might	be	possible	to	counter	that	whereas	comparisons	to	some	non-
human	entities	are	complimentary,	comparisons	to	others	are,	for	some	as	yet	
unspecified	reason,	dehumanising.	However,	ingroup	members	sometimes	
compare	themselves	to	the	same	supposedly	‘disgusting	and	dangerous’	animals	
to	which	outgroups	are	often	compared.		For	example,	the	Tutsis	in	Rwanda	
were	often	compared	to	snakes	by	propagandists	(Tirrell,	2012)	but	the	
American	revolutionaries	often	compared	themselves	to	snakes.	The	Gadsden	
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flag	of	the	American	Revolution	depicts	the	American	people	as	a	rattlesnake	
ready	to	bite	the	British	Empire	(Rankin,	1954,	see	Figure	1).		Taken	together,	
these	examples	demonstrate	that	comparisons	to	animals	are	not,	in	and	of	
themselves,	problematic	nor	do	they	necessarily	reflect	a	deep	difference	in	how	
members	of	ingroups	and	outgroups	are	represented.	The	challenge	for	the	
dehumanisation	hypothesis	is	to	explain	why	comparisons	to	non-human	
entities	are	sometimes	taken	as	evidence	for	dehumanisation	and	sometimes	
not.		
	
Figure	1.	Groups	often	refer	to	themselves	in	terms	of	non-human	entities.		
Tottenham	Hotspur	Emblem,	Chicago	Bulls	Emblem,	The	Gadsden	Flag.		
	
Challenge	2:	Outgroup	members	are	often	described	in	ways	that	only	
apply	to	humans	
The	dehumanisation	hypothesis	proposes	that,	to	the	extent	they	are	
dehumanised,	outgroup	members	are	perceived	in	a	similar	way	to	non-human	
entities,	most	commonly	animals	or	automata	(Haslam	2006;	Haslam	&	
Loughnan,	2014;	Haslam,	Loughnan,	&	Sun,	2011;	Smith,	2011).		Although	there	
may	be	occasions	on	which	outgroup	members	are	described	in	ways	that	are	
equivalent	to	how	animals	and	automata	are	described,	these	cases	are	much	
less	common	than	they	first	appear.	A	careful	reading	of	propaganda	and	hate	
speech	reveals	that	target	groups	are	often	described	in	ways	that	only	apply	to	
humans	(Bloom	2017;	Manne,	2016).	For	example,	Nazi	propaganda	often	
referred	to	Jewish	people	as	criminals,	murderers,	enemies	and	traitors	(Keen,	
1992).		These	terms	are	readily	applied	to	humans	but	make	little	sense	if	
applied	to	animals	or	other	non-human	entities	(Manne,	2016).	A	rat	or	an	
automaton	cannot	be	a	criminal	or	a	traitor.	The	use	of	these	descriptors	thus	
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suggests	that	the	Jewish	population	were	at	least	implicitly	represented	as	
human.		
It	might	be	possible	to	counter	this	critique	by	arguing	that	outgroups	are	
sometimes	dehumanised,	or	dehumanised	by	some	writers,	and	discriminated	
against	in	different	ways	at	other	times	and	by	other	writers.	However,	this	idea	
does	not	fit	with	the	historical	evidence	either	-	a	variety	of	metaphors	often	
appear	within	the	same	piece	of	propaganda.	For	example,	in	the	piece	‘The	
Jewish	World	Plague’	Hermann	Esser	(1939)	describes	Jews	as	weeds,	parasites	
and	worms	but	also	as	swindlers,	thieves,	beggars	and	deceivers.		In	the	piece,	
‘To	know	the	Jew	is	to	understand	the	meaning	of	war’,	distributed	by	the	Nazi	
Propaganda	Office	in	1944,	Jewish	people	are	described	as	parasites,	mistletoe,	
and	an	infection	but	also	as	deadly	foes,	slanderers	and	desirous	of	world	
domination.		
As	Manne	(2016)	and	Appiah	(2008)	have	pointed	out,	even	in	the	act	of	
referring	to	a	group	as	lice	or	vermin	propagandists	reveal	an	implicit	
recognition	of	the	difference	between	their	targets	and	the	animals	to	which	they	
are	compared.		There	is	no	sense	in	consistently	reminding	a	rat	that	it	is,	in	fact,	
a	rat	(Manne,	2016).		Rather,	the	power	of	the	metaphor	comes	from	the	
recognition	that	the	two	entities	are	different	(Bloom,	2017).			If	victims	of	
intergroup	harm	are	not	viewed	as	less	than	human	even	in	these	supposedly	
prototypical	cases,	then	the	onus	is	on	proponents	of	the	dehumanisation	
hypothesis	to	explain	when	outgroups	are	dehumanised.	
	
Challenge	3:	Being	associated	with	a	non-human	entity	is	not	equivalent	to	
being	seen	as	similar	to	that	non-human	entity		
Psychologists	have	typically	relied	more	heavily	on	evidence	from	lab-based	
research	than	on	evidence	from	the	historical	record.	For	example,	data	showing	
that	White	Americans	implicitly	associate	African	Americans	with	apes	in	lab-
based	tasks	is	often	cited	as	an	example	of	dehumanisation	(Goff	et	al.,	2008;	
2014).		While	these	implicit	associations	are	clearly	deeply	problematic	they	are	
not	convincing	evidence	that	African	Americans	are	perceived	as	less	human	
than	are	White	Americans	or	as	akin	to	apes.		Associative	connections	between	
two	stimuli	do	not	necessarily	suggest	that	they	will	be	viewed	as	equivalent	or	
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as	similar	to	each	other.	To	borrow	an	example	from	the	animal	learning	
literature,	a	rat	may	come	to	associate	a	grey	square	with	food	through	repeated	
presentation	of	the	square	in	conjunction	with	food	(Rescorla	&	Wagner,	1972).		
However,	the	rat	does	not	come	to	think	of	the	grey	square	as	being	food	or	
similar	to	food	(and	would	not	try	to	eat	it).	Relatedly,	cultural	pairings	may	lead	
to	associations	between	African	Americans	and	apes,	which	reveal	themselves	in	
non-verbal	tasks	in	the	lab	but	that	is	not,	on	its	own,	evidence	that	participants	
in	those	studies	viewed	African	Americans	as	similar	to	apes.	
	
Challenge	4:	Outgroup	members	may	be	denied	some	mental	states	but	
they	are	frequently	attributed	others	
In	some	theories,	dehumanisation	is	characterised	as	a	“failure	to	consider	the	
mind	of	another	person”	(Harris	&	Fiske,	2011;	see	also	Hackel,	et	al.,	2014;	
Harris	&	Fiske,	2006;	2001;	Leyens	et	al.,	2007;	Rai,	et	al.,	2017;	Waytz,	Gray,	
Epley,	&	Wegner,	2010).	In	the	seminal	study	advocating	for	this	view,	Harris	
and	Fiske	(2006)	provided	evidence	that,	when	presented	with	images	of	
homeless	individuals	and	drug	addicts,	participants	display	less	activity	in	brain	
regions	associated	with	mentalising.		
This	characterisation	of	dehumanisation	does	not	appear	to	accurately	
characterise	how	outgroup	members	are	perceived.	There	are	certainly	
situations	in	which	the	thoughts	and	emotions	of	outgroup	members	are	not	
sufficiently	salient	to	dominant	majorities	(Harris	&	Fiske,	2011).	However,	I	
predict	that	outgroup	members	are	not	thought	to	lack	all	mental	states	or	even	
to	hold	mental	states	to	a	lesser	extent.		While	outgroup	members	may	be	denied	
some	mental	states,	they	are	likely	attributed	others	(Hackel,	et	al.,	2014).	To	
analyse	Harris	and	Fiske’s	own	example	a	little	more	closely,	drug	addicts	are	
often	criticised	because	of	how	observers	represent	their	mental	states	-	they	are	
perceived	as	greedy	and	lacking	in	self	control	(Corrigan,	Kuwabara,	&	
O’Shaughnessy,	2009).	Further	evidence	that	this	is	the	case	can	be	drawn	from	
historical	record.	Even	in	supposedly	prototypical	examples	of	blatant	
dehumanisation,	target	groups	are	described	in	terms	of	mental	states.		
Propaganda	often	references	the	mental	states	of	its	targets	in	order	to	generate	
hatred	against	them.	In	Nazi	propaganda,	for	example,	Jewish	people	were	often	
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attacked	for	their	supposed	cunning,	malice	and	scheming	against	the	Nazi	
regime	(Bywerk.	2004;	Keen	1992;	Kershaw,	2001).	 	
Furthermore,	it	is	not	clear	why	possessing	certain	mental	states	to	a	
lesser	extent	should	be	conceptualised	as	dehumanisation.	Equally	problematic	
for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	are	cases	where	ingroup	members	are	denied	
some	mental	states	or	afforded	them	to	a	lesser	extent.		For	example,	ingroup	
members	are	typically	judged	to	be	less	deceptive,	sneaky	and	ruthless	than	are	
outgroup	members	(Dunham,	2018).	We	are	thus	left	with	a	peculiar	situation	in	
which	biases	in	mental	state	attribution	are	sometimes	characterised	as	
dehumanisation	and	sometimes	not.		
	
Challenge	5:	Outgroup	members	are	granted	some	uniquely	human	
attributes	
Haslam	and	colleagues	argue	that	groups	can	be	dehumanised	in	one	of	two	
respects.		They	can	fall	victim	to	animalistic	dehumanisation	in	which	they	are	
thought	to	possess	attributes	like	civility,	refinement	and	rationality	to	a	lesser	
extent	than	do	the	ingroup.		Alternatively,	they	can	fall	victim	to	mechanistic	
dehumanisation,	in	which	they	are	thought	to	possess	attributes	like	emotional	
responsiveness,	interpersonal	warmth	and	agency	to	a	lesser	extent	than	do	the	
ingroup	(Haslam	et	al.,	2005;	Haslam,	2006;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	2014).			
On	closer	inspection,	Haslam	and	colleagues’	characterisation	of	
dehumanisation	appears	incomplete.	In	particular,	it	omits	anti-social	attributes	
like	jealously,	spite,	dishonesty	and	disloyalty.	These	anti-social	attributes	are	
not	salient	in	Haslam’s	characterisation	of	the	concept	‘human’	and	yet	they	only	
make	sense	when	applied	to	humans.		It	would	be	extremely	unusual,	and	most	
likely	inappropriate,	to	describe	an	animal	or	a	machine	as	disloyal	or	spiteful,	
for	example	(Manne,	2016;	2018).		
	I	propose	that	this	problem	arises	because	of	the	way	in	which	Haslam	and	
colleagues	sought	to	identify	participants’	lay	concept	of	humanness.	Haslam	and	
colleagues	assumed	that	they	could	characterise	the	lay	concept	of	humanness	
by	asking	participants	two	questions:	which	from	among	a	list	of	attributes	they	
felt	distinguished	humans	from	other	species	and	which	attributes	they	thought	
were	characteristic	of	humans.		This	approach	is	at	odds	with	decades	of	
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research	in	the	cognitive	psychology	of	categorisation	(Barsalou,	1989;	Bellezza,	
1984;	McNamara	&	Sternberg,	1983;	Medin,	1989).	Research	in	this	area	
demonstrates	that	the	attributes	that	appear	typical	of	a	category	will	vary	
depending	on	the	context	(Smith	&	Medin,	1981).		In	this	case,	the	attributes	that	
appear	typical	of	the	category	human	will	differ	depending	on	the	comparison	
point.	As	a	thought	experiment,	imagine	that	instead	of	asking	his	participants	
what	distinguishes	humans	from	other	species,	Haslam	and	colleagues	had	asked	
their	participants	what	distinguishes	humans	from	another	non-human	category	
-	angels	(see	Figure	2).		I	predict	that	more	anti-social	qualities	such	as	greed,	
jealousy,	laziness	and	spite	would	have	been	listed	as	typical	of	humans	in	this	
context.		Somewhat	different	attributes	again	would	be	salient	to	participants	if	
the	comparison	point	was	zombies,	robots,	rats	or	dolphins.	It	is	no	coincidence	
that	Haslam	et	al.	asked	their	participants	two	questions,	and	found	evidence	for	
two	characterisations	of	the	concept	human.		Had	they	asked	their	participants	a	
third	question,	for	example	how	humans	differ	from	angels,	they	may	well	have	
found	evidence	for	three	forms.	This	leaves	us	with	a	puzzle	whereby	being	
perceived	as	somewhat	lacking	civility	and	warmth	is	thought	to	constitute	
dehumanisation,	whereas	being	seen	as	somewhat	lacking	in	spite	and	jealousy,	
also	attributes	unique	to	humans,	is	not	thought	to	constitute	dehumanisation.	
When	we	consider	these	uniquely	human	but	anti-social	attributes	as	part	
of	what	it	means	to	be	human,	it	is	no	longer	clear	that	outgroups	are	perceived	
as	less	human	than	are	ingroups.	Outgroup	members	are	often	thought	to	
possess	anti-social	attributes	such	as	cunning	and	spite.	Indeed,	they	are	thought	
to	possess	them	to	a	greater	extent	than	are	members	of	the	ingroup	(Fiske,	
Cuddy,	Glick,	&	Xu,	2002).		
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Figure	2.	The	salience	of	particular	attributes	depends	on	the	comparison	
point.		Attributes	listed	when	comparing	humans	to	gorillas	will	be	different	
from	those	listed	when	comparing	humans	to	angels.		
	
Challenge	6:	Groups	are	often	persecuted	because	of	their	perceived	
humanity	
The	dehumanisation	hypothesis	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	being	perceived	
as	human	tends	to	offer	protection	from	harm.		In	this	view,	humans	naturally	
empathise	with	and	care	for	each	other	(Harris,	2017;	Harris	&	Fiske,	2011;	
Smith	2011).	When	a	group	is	perceived	to	be	less	human,	or	less	than	human,	
some	of	these	natural	responses	of	care	and	empathy	are	thought	to	be	eroded	
rendering	the	group	more	vulnerable	to	harm	(Harris,	2017;	Smith,	2011;	
Haslam,	2006;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	2014).		
This	confidence	in	humans’	desire	to	protect	and	care	for	each	other	is	
partly	misplaced	(Lang,	2010).		Although	humans	do	often	care	for	each	other,	
certain	groups	may	be	targeted	because	they	are	believed	to	possess	uniquely	
human	mental	states	and	attributes	(Bloom	2017;	Manne,	2018).		It	seems	
relatively	uncontroversial	to	predict	that	perceiving	a	group	to	have	human	
qualities	such	as	spite	and	cunning	will	make	them	appear	a	threat.	A	threat	that,	
in	extreme	cases,	will	need	to	be	controlled	or	destroyed	(Keen,	1992).	Similarly,	
believing	a	group	exists	in	human-specific	social	relations	to	a	dominant	majority	
such	as	being	enemies,	traitors,	rapists	or	criminals,	will	likely	make	them	
appear	morally	responsible	for	their	actions	(Brown	&	Webb,	2007).	This	is	one	
reason	why	violence	against	target	groups	can	take	on	a	moral	quality	(Rai	&	
Fiske,	2014;	Rai	et	al.,	2017).		Whereas	eradicating	vermin	might	be	seen	as	
desirable,	the	lynching	or	mass	murder	of	humans	can	be	framed	as	a	moral	
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crusade	(Dray	2003;	Keen,	1992;	Rai	&	Fiske,	2014).		Consistent	with	this	
observation,	lynching	of	African	Americans	was	often	presented	as	exacting	
justice	upon	the	guilty	(Dray,	2003).	Similarly,	propaganda	in	Nazi	Germany	
often	described	the	German	population	as	the	victim	of	Jewish	aggression	and	
plots	(Keen,	1992).	In	lab-based	research,	Rai	and	colleagues	(2017)	have	shown	
that	reflecting	on	the	mental	states	of	a	potential	target	increases	morally	
motivated	violence	against	them.				
Related	to	this,	Manne	(2018)	has	pointed	out	that	victims	of	atrocities	are	
humiliated	and	tortured	because	their	abusers	at	least	implicitly	recognise	their	
humanity.	Whereas	rats	might	be	killed,	they	are	not	forced	to	simulate	sex	acts	
with	other	rats	nor	are	they	forced	to	watch	their	fellow	rats	die.	Nor	would	
there	be	any	sense	in	publicly	humiliating	or	murdering	a	rat	in	order	to	serve	as	
a	warning	to	other	rats.	Yet	human	victims	often	suffer	these	indignities	(Bloom,	
2017;	Brown	&	Webb,	2007;	Dray,	2003).	Thus,	even	in	these	supposedly	
prototypically	dehumanising	actions,	perpetrators	implicitly	acknowledge	the	
difference	between	their	victims	and	non-human	entities	in	the	type	of	harm	that	
they	inflict	upon	them	(Bloom,	2017;	Manne,	2016;	2018).		
	
Challenge	7:	Being	seen	as	less	than	human	is	not	necessarily	a	risk	factor	
for	harm	
Equally	problematic	for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis	are	cases	where	
individuals	are	thought	to	lack	characteristically	human	qualities	and	yet	are	not	
subjected	to	harm.	Consider	the	example	of	a	baby.	As	Smith	(2011)	has	
observed,	babies	are	not	typically	considered	to	have	complex	thoughts	and	
beliefs.	Nor	are	they	thought	to	possess	typically	human	attributes	such	as	
refinement,	civility	and	maturity.		Yet,	they	are	treated	with	the	utmost	care	and	
devotion	by	their	parents	and	caregivers.		Indeed,	treating	young	children	as	
more	mature	and	rational	than	they	are	would	most	likely	be	harmful	to	them	
(Goff,	Jackson,	Di	Leonie,	Culotta,	&	DiTomasso,	2014).		
Even	when	organisms	are	clearly	viewed	as	outside	of,	or	indeed	beneath,	
the	human	category	they	are	not	necessarily	at	risk	of	harm.	Although	many	
animals	are	treated	badly	by	humans,	some	are	treated	with	care.		People	donate	
substantial	funds	to	conservation	efforts	focused	on	animals	like	the	Great	Panda	
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for	example.	Even	allegedly	dangerous	and	disgusting	animals	such	as	snakes	are	
protected	by	conservation	efforts.	Likewise,	family	pets,	while	typically	thought	
less	important	than	humans,	are	usually	treasured	and	protected	by	their	human	
families	(see	Figure	3).			
	
Figure	3.	Entities	viewed	as	‘less	than	human’	are	sometimes	treated	with	care.		
	
In	certain	circumstances,	animals	are	actually	treated	with	greater	care	
than	are	humans.	In	the	UK,	the	Royal	Society	for	the	Prevention	of	Cruelty	to	
Animals	(the	RSPCA)	receives	substantially	more	donations	than	Shelter,	the	
best	known	charity	for	the	homeless	(Annual	Report,	2017/2017;	Trustee’s	
reports	and	accounts,	2018).	On	an	individual	level,	Hitler	was	responsible	for	
the	murder	of	millions	of	innocent	people	and	yet	he	adored	his	pet	dogs	
(Kershaw,	2001).	Objects	too	are	sometimes	treated	with	great	care.	The	
campaign	to	save	Notre	Dame	after	the	2019	fire	raised	hundreds	of	millions	of	
euros	(as	reported	in	the	Guardian,	2019).	These	examples	suggest	that	it	is	not	
being	perceived	as	less	than	human	per	se	that	puts	a	group	at	risk	of	harm.			
	
Is	it	possible	to	explain	the	prevalence	of	non-human	metaphors	in	
propaganda	without	recourse	to	the	concept	of	dehumanisation?			
I	have	outlined	seven	challenges	for	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis.		I	have	
argued,	that	while	there	are	clearly	differences	in	how	members	of	different	
social	groups	are	perceived,	these	differences	do	not	seem	best	characterised	as	
a	psychological	process	of	‘dehumanisation’.	This	leaves	us	with	an	open	
question,	however.		If	outgroup	members	are	not	really	perceived	as	less	than	
human,	then	how	are	we	to	explain	the	apparent	prevalence	of	comparisons	to	
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non-human	entities	in	propaganda	and	other	forms	of	hate	speech?		Below	I	
sketch	an	alternative	theoretical	account	of	why	comparisons	to	non-human	
entities	are	sometimes	associated	with	harm.		
Propagandists	use	comparisons	to	certain	non-human	entities	in	order	to	
persuade	audiences	to	view	their	target	group	in	a	negative	light.	By	consistently	
pairing	representations	of	a	target	group	with	negatively	valenced	stimuli	such	
as	disease	and	lice,	propagandists	encourage	observers	to	negatively	evaluate	
that	group.		Importantly,	this	mechanism	is	not	specific	to	references	to	sub-
human	categories.	Rather,	conditioning	can	take	place	by	pairing	the	group	with	
any	negative	concept	including	words	that	evoke	human-specific	social	relations	
such	as	enemy,	rapist,	criminal,	and	traitor	(Siegel	&	Allan,	1996).		
Referring	to	a	target	group	as	certain	types	of	non-human	entity	also	
licenses	particular	inferences	about	that	group	and	their	supposed	traits	(Tirrell,	
2012).	For	example,	by	evoking	the	idea	that	a	target	group	are	like	cockroaches,	
a	propagandist	might	convey	the	idea	that	they	disgusting	and	low	status.	By	
evoking	the	idea	that	a	target	group	are	like	monkeys,	a	propagandist	might	
convey	the	idea	that	they	are	stupid	and	unsophisticated.	Metaphors	of	this	type	
can	also	license	particular	behaviours	(Tirrell,	2012).		For	example,	whereas	
comparing	a	target	group	to	oxen	might	imply	that	they	ought	to	be	enslaved,	
comparing	a	target	group	to	cockroaches	might	imply	that	they	ought	to	be	
exterminated.		Again,	this	mechanism	is	not	specific	to	subhuman	categories.		
Referring	to	a	target	group	as	‘the	enemy’	licenses	the	inference	that	they	are	a	
threat	and	need	to	be	defeated.		
To	the	extent	that	comparisons	to	non-human	entities	are	more	common	
in	propaganda	and	hate	speech	than	they	are	in	other	forms	of	communication,	it	
may	be	because	they	are	especially	effective	ways	of	conveying	multiple	negative	
messages	simultaneously.	For	example,	whereas	using	the	insult	‘enemy’	
conveys	the	idea	that	the	target	group	is	a	threat,	using	the	insult	‘louse’	not	only	
conveys	that	the	group	is	a	threat,	but	also	that	the	group	is	contaminating,	low	
status	and	homogenous	in	character.		
Non-human	metaphors	can	also	be	used	to	communicate	negative	
messages	to	the	target	group	themselves	-	they	can	be	used	to	humiliate	and	
threaten	(Bloom,	2017;	Lang,	2010;	Manne,	2016).		In	these	cases,	it	is	not	the	
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message	that	the	group	is	less	than	human	per	se	that	is	problematic.	Rather,	
these	non-human	comparisons	are	offensive	to	the	extent	that	they	imply	the	
target	group	is	low	status,	disgusting	and	threatening.	In	Western	culture,	it	
would	be	bizarre	but	not	particularly	offensive	to	repeatedly	refer	to	a	group	as	
dolphins	or	pandas	(both	of	which	are	considered	‘less	than	human’),	whereas	it	
would	be	deeply	offensive	to	refer	to	a	group	as	rats.	The	insult	‘rat’	is	offensive	
because	of	learned	associations	between	rats,	disease,	contamination	and	threat.		
It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	comparisons	to	non-human	entities	are	not	
always	used	intentionally	to	persuade	or	humiliate.		If	listeners	repeatedly	hear	a	
target	group	compared	to	negatively	valenced	animals,	like	rats	or	snakes,	then	
they	will	come	to	associate	that	group	with	those	particular	entities	(Devine,	
1989).		Once	this	association	is	in	place,	when	listeners	hear	the	target	group	
mentioned,	images	of	the	associated	entity	will	be	automatically	activated	(Goff,	
et	al.,	2008).	Automatic	associations	between	outgroups	and	animals,	or	indeed	
other	negatively	valenced	categories,	can	leak	in	to	communication	outside	of	
conscious	awareness.	For	example,	an	individual	who	automatically	associates	a	
particular	group	with	apes	might	use	terms	like	‘jungle’,	‘wild’	and	‘creature’	
when	describing	that	group	even	when	they	have	no	intention	of	exacerbating	
animosity	towards	the	group	in	question.		
Importantly,	comparisons	to	non-human	entities	are	not	always	used	to	
criticise,	humiliate	and	demean.	They	can	also	be	invoked	to	compliment	a	group	
and	extol	their	virtuous	intentions	and	attributes.	For	example,	consistently	
referring	to	a	group	as	lions	might	activate	associated	inferences	about	courage	
and	dominance.	Referring	to	a	group	as	angels	might	emphasise	the	ways	in	
which	their	mental	states	and	attributes	are	worthy	of	respect	and	admiration.	
Again,	according	to	my	perspective,	references	to	non-human	entities	are	not	the	
only	way	to	convey	these	messages,	but	they	are	one	effective	means	by	which	to	
do	so.		
	
Directions	for	future	research	
The	seven	challenges	outlined	here	bring	much	of	what	we	thought	we	knew	
about	dehumanisation	into	question.		These	challenges	also	suggest	a	number	of	
priorities	for	future	research	that	will	enable	the	field	to	distinguish	between	the	
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dehumanisation	hypothesis	and	the	alternative	I	have	outlined	here.	First,	it	will	
be	crucial	to	conduct	systematic	content	analyses	of	historical	documents	in	
order	to	establish	the	incidence	of	non-human	comparisons	in	propaganda	and	
other	forms	of	hate	speech.	In	conducting	these	content	analyses,	it	will	be	of	
paramount	importance	to	avoid	the	confirmation	bias	whereby	the	historical	
record	is	only	searched	for	examples	that	provide	positive	evidence	for	the	
dehumanisation	hypothesis	(that	is,	cases	where	target	groups	are	referred	to	as	
non-human	entities).		The	most	problematic	cases	for	the	dehumanisation	
hypothesis	include	passages	where	target	groups	are	described	in	terms	of	
uniquely	human	attributes,	mental	states	and	emotions.		
Another	priority	for	future	research	is	to	re-assess	how	the	construct	of	
dehumanisation	is	operationalized.		Thus	far,	much	psychological	research	on	
dehumanisation	has	focused	on	the	attribution	of	broadly	positive	and	prosocial	
qualities	such	as	civility,	rationality,	warmth,	pride	and	guilt	(Haslam,	2006;	
Leyens	et	al.,	2007).	Future	research	must	incorporate	insights	from	context	
dependent	categorisation	in	order	to	understand	whether	adults	also	associate	
anti-social	attributes	such	as	jealousy,	spite,	cunning,	greed	and	dishonesty	with	
the	concept	of	human.			
If	it	transpires	that	participants	do	associate	anti-social	attributes	such	as	
these	with	the	concept	human,	then	further	empirical	studies	can	determine	
whether	outgroup	members	are	thought	to	possess	all	uniquely	human	
attributes	to	a	lesser	extent	(as	predicted	by	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis)	or	
only	those	which	are	prosocial	in	nature.	Furthermore,	future	work	can	reassess	
the	hypothesised	causal	relationship	between	the	attribution	of	uniquely	human	
qualities	and	intergroup	harm	by	evaluating	whether	describing	a	potential	
victim	in	terms	of	uniquely	human	but	anti-social	attributes	places	them	at	
greater	or	lesser	risk	of	harm.		
		
Conclusion	
According	to	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis,	when	a	dominant	majority	
describes	an	outgroup	as	‘rats’	or	‘lice’,	they	do	so	because	they	believe	that	
group	to	be	less	than	human.	This	argument	has	an	elegant	simplicity	and	an	
intuitive	appeal.		Not	surprisingly,	therefore,	it	has	become	extremely	prominent	
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in	social	psychology,	social	neuroscience	and	certain	areas	of	philosophy	(Harris	
&	Fiske,	2006;	2009;	Haslam,	2006;	Haslam	&	Loughnan,	2014;	Leyens	et	al.,	
2007;	Smith,	2011;	2014;	2016).	Indeed,	it	is	all	but	accepted	as	fact	that	certain	
groups	suffer	dehumanisation	(Smith,	2016).		
I	have	argued	that	the	explanatory	power	of	this	hypothesis	is	considerably	
more	restricted	that	it	first	appears.		While	there	may	be	some	cases	in	which	
outgroup	members	are	genuinely	believed	to	be	less	than	human,	there	is	not	yet	
convincing	evidence	that	this	is	a	common	phenomenon.		Comparisons	to	non-
human	entities	are	not	restricted	to	outgroups,	nor	are	outgroups	regularly	
described	in	similar	ways	to	non-human	entities.		While	members	of	outgroups	
are	often	perceived	to	be	lacking	in	some	human	qualities	and	attributes,	they	
may	well	be	thought	to	possess	other	human	attributes	to	a	greater	extent	than	
do	the	ingroup	(Bloom,	2018;	Lang,	2010;	Manne,	2016).	Added	to	this,	there	are	
other	plausible	explanations	for	why	comparisons	to	non-human	entities	may	be	
common	in	propaganda	and	other	forms	of	hate	speech.		It	remains	for	future	
empirical	research	to	determine	the	relative	merits	of	the	dehumanisation	
hypothesis	and	the	alternative	view	I	have	suggested	here.	
If	supported	by	future	empirical	research,	the	argument	I	have	advanced	
has	important	implications	our	understanding	of	how	to	bring	about	social	
change.		Inspired	by	the	dehumanisation	hypothesis,	researchers	have	shown	an	
increasing	interest	in	developing	interventions	to	reduce	intergroup	harm	that	
focus	around	‘humanising’	outgroups	(Albarello	&	Rubini,	2012;	Gaunt,	2009).	
My	critique	suggests	that	other	routes	to	reducing	intergroup	harm	may	prove	
more	effective.	Encouraging	dominant	majorities	to	reflect	on	the	humanity	of	
outgroups	could	even	backfire	in	certain	circumstances.	For	example,	if	it	leads	
to	increased	focus	on	the	supposedly	anti-social	mental	states	and	attributes	of	
the	group	in	question.	
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